The Mission
This is where you decide what is the least risky way to accomplish the mission. A nighttime parachute insertion through triple jungle canopy might not definitively destroy your chances of success, but it will probably hurt them. On the other hand, a broken outboard engine will probably not affect a rubber boat insertion, depending on how fast the engine can be replaced with a spare.
This is not a science for determining how risky a mission is. It’s a tool for comparing risks between missions. Unless you can accurately quantify risk, you’re still working with hunches on how things should be, gut feelings about the enemy, and your jagged sense of experience. There are no statistics available that can determine the likelihood that a wounded sniper will be able to make a clean shot, a parachutist will safely crash through jungle canopy, or a boat crew will be able to quickly swap out a broken engine.
Instead, this is where you get to decide how big your pants are. SEAL mission commanders make the call on which kind of underwater reconnaissance to do after listening to the sea daddies who have been around the world several times. After searching through their own memories for something that resembles their current situation. And after reaching deep down inside. Then the call is often the best of two options. And in the end, no matter how it’s done, divers still have to go in at night and get wet.
For each risk, assess both the chance that the risk will occur and the consequences of the risk’s occurring. An improperly loaded bullet is not likely to happen on a reconnaissance mission, and its impact would probably not be mission−defeating. That’s a low−risk event with limited consequences. On the other hand, a daylight helicopter insertion over a fortified border is likely to result in antiaircraft missiles being fired, which would probably end everyone’s sunny day. That’s a high−risk event with catastrophic consequences. Everything else is in between.
The Take−Away
Place your bets where they count. The potential reward from developing software that will serve 50 million consumers is a lot greater than that from developing software that will serve 5 million. What if the potentially more popular software takes twice as long to develop? You’re still better off backing that venture, everything else being equal. What if software writers for the more popular program cost twice as much to employ? What if bugs in the more popular system will lead to $2 million in returns? Now the risks are growing greater. What if a competitor began developing comparable software 3 weeks before you?
The math adds up easily. The other things—the unquantifiables—are more difficult. Here’s a question: How much less would your salary be and how much less authority would you have if you didn’t have to make such decisions?